Torts of Electric Utilities: Can Strict Liability be Plugged In by Hollows, Gregory G.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
9-1-1978
Torts of Electric Utilities: Can Strict Liability be
Plugged In
Gregory G. Hollows
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gregory G. Hollows, Torts of Electric Utilities: Can Strict Liability be Plugged In, 11 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 775 (1978).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol11/iss4/3
TORTS OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES: CAN STRICT
LIABILITY BE PLUGGED IN?
I. INTRODUCTION
Electricity, as well as the hazards of electricity, is a fact of life in the
United States.' Indeed, accidents involving electricity run the gamut
of one's imagination from the commonplace to the bizarre. Fire
caused by electric sparks is an annual occurrence during the California
dry season 2 and many homes are lost yearly due to electricity related
accidents.3 Less common occurrences may have even more tragic re-
sults. Not long ago, an individual, standing on a fire escape, attempted
to unscrew a light bulb in a street lamp because it had been disturbing
his sleep. He was electrocuted.4
Moreover, there has been no scarcity of personal injury/property
damage tort litigation involving electric utilities. Thus, one might ex-
pect the issue of strict liability, in tort5 as applied to electric utilities to
have been broached by the California courts long ago. Surprisingly,
neither the appellate courts nor the state supreme court have ever ad-
dressed this subject. However, varying approaches to this issue have
recently appeared in the superior courts of California. In Orange
1. Figures derived from National Safety Council statistics show an increasing number of
accidental deaths nationwide caused by electric shock. For example, electric shock was the
cause of 1088 deaths in 1972, 1149 in 1973, 1157 in 1974, and 1224 in 1975 (latest figures
available). The 1975 figure of 1224 deaths caused by electric shock was broken down into
four categories: (a) home wiring and appliance-258; (b) industrial wiring and appli-
ance-158; (c) other electric current-662; and (d) unspecified electric current-146. NA-
TIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 12 (1977).
These figures, of course, do not take into account personal injuries not resulting in death
or property damage caused by electrical accidents. Moreover, there is no way to determine
how many of these deaths were attributable to a utility company.
2. Litigation against California electric utilities for fires proximately caused by malfunc-
tioning electrical apparatus and transmission lines is commonplace. See, e.g., Scally v. Pa-
cific Gas & Elec. Co., 23 Cal. App. 3d 806, 100 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1972).
3. E.g., Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196
N.W.2d 316 (1972).
4. Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 178,496 P.2d 1276, 1281, 101 Cal. Rptr.
908, 913 (1972).
5. The terms "products liability" and "strict liability" are differentiated in this article.
Products liability encompasses many different tort theories which permit recovery for inju-
ries caused by defective products. Strict liability holds the manufacturer or retailer of a
product liable for defective products in the absence of fault. See 2 L. FRUMER & M.
FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A(l)-(2) (1978). In California, although not in all
other jurisdictions, the terms are often used synonymously.
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County,6 the superior court overruled a demurrer to a count of strict
liability where a resident suffered bum injuries while attaching a citi-
zen's band radio antenna to the roof of his house. The antenna had
come in contact with (or was close to) the utility wires7 near the roof,
resulting in an electrical arc. A demurrer to strict liability allegations
was similarly overruled in litigation arising from the devastating Santa
Barbara fire of 1977, allegedly caused by sparks resulting from the con-
tact of a kite with various electric utility wires.' However, in two ac-
tions9 arising out of the crash of a helicopter into utility wires, the
courts of two counties refused to entertain the notion that utilities could
be held strictly liable for the placement of their wires.10
The purpose of this comment is to discover whether this "grass
roots" movement in respect to electric utility liability in California is
foreshadowing an expansion of strict liability to electric utilities; and if
so, whether such expansion constitutes a basic misunderstanding of
strict liability principles." An analysis of strict liability law and policy
favors this contention.
6. Laurence v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., Civ. No. 258578 (Orange County Super. Ct.,
filed Dec. 3, 1976).
7. Utility companies prefer to label their power lines as "conductors" rather than wires.
8. Baumgartner v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., Civ. No. 118854 (Santa Barbara County
Super. Ct., filed Aug. 25, 1977). But see Firemen's Fund Inc. v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.,
Civ. No. 120880 (Santa Barbara County Super. Ct., filed Jan. 23, 1978). This latter action
was instituted as a result of the same fire as in Baumgartner, however, the strict liability
claim was dismissed without leave to amend.
9. Scott v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., Civ. No. 176937 (San Bernardino County Super.
Ct., filed April 22, 1977); Brown v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., Civ. No. C 180535 (Los Ange-
les County Super. Ct., filed Nov. 16, 1976).
10. See note 104 infra and accompanying text. Plaintiffs seek to invoke the doctrine of
strict liability and defendants attempt to avoid its use, because under strict liability, a plain-
tiffs chance of recovery in a personal injury/property damage cause of action is greatly
enhanced. When using strict liability, a plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant
acted in an unreasonable manner either in the manufacture of the specific product in ques-
tion or in the defendant's manufacturing process in general. Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963). Until very
recently, California plaintiffs relying upon a strict liability cause of action had the additional
advantage of not being accountable for their own negligence; however, that is no longer true.
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
390 (1978).
11. The opposing considerations involved in expanding strict liability to electric utilities
have been described as follows: "Novelty, of itself, does not foreclose consideration of plain-
tiff's contentions in this field of developing tort law. ... Neither does it justify a headlong
leap to impose strict liability unless, based on proper policy considerations and reason, such
liability should be found." Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 229, 227 A.2d 539, 540
(Hudson County Ct. 1967) (citation omitted), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J.
Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968) (per curiam), affd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129
(1969) (per curiam).
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTRIC UTILITY TORT LIABILITY IN
CALIFORNIA
In California, litigation involving utilities based on personal injury
or property damage claims has always been governed by the law of
negligence. In Giraudi v. Electric Improvement Co. ,12 one of the earli-
est California cases addressing the liability of a utility company for
damage caused by electricity, the California Supreme Court stated that
"[d]efendant [utility] was using a dangerous force, and one not gener-
ally understood. It was required to use very great care to prevent in-
jury to person or property."13 The negligence rule became so well
entrenched that in 1933 a California appellate court could state that
"[tihe rule has ofttimes been expressed that defendant electric company
is not liable unless it could reasonably have anticipated the danger."
14
Although courts have described electricity as a "dangerous quantity
of electric fluid" 5 which is carried by "deadly wires,'"16 the supplying
of electricity in California has never been held to be an ultrahazardous
activity.7 This result is probably due to the requirement that an ul-
trahazardous activity not be a matter of common usage.18 The ul-
trahazardous activity rule is not applied where the person harmed by
the activity "has reason to know of the risk which makes the activity
ultrahazardous and. . . takes part in it, . . . [or is] a member of the
public entitled to the services of a public utility carrying on the activ-
12. 107 Cal. 120, 40 P. 108 (1895).
13. Id. at 124, 40 P. at 109 (emphasis added).
14. Hauser v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 133 Cal. App. 222, 226, 23 P.2d 1"068, 1070 (1933).
15. Dow v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 157 Cal. 182, 184, 106 P. 587, 588 (1910).
16. Pennebaker v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., 158 Cal. 579, 588, 112 P. 459, 463
(1910). Even though a fireman was killed when he came in contact with a live wire, the
court in Pennebaker came to the conclusion that wires carrying only 260 volts were not
"deadly." Id.
17. McKenzie v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 731, 736, 19 Cal. Rptr. 628,
631 (1962), reV'don othergrounds, Di Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal. 2d 292, 299, 373 P.2d 860, 864,
23 Cal. Rptr. 772, 776 (1962) (McKenzie's interpretation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
disapproved).
18. Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489, 498, 190 P.2d 1, 7 (1948). Liability for an ul-
trahazardous activity is not to be confused with strict liability. One is "absolutely" liable
for injuries caused by his performance of an ultrahazardous activity. Id. at 492, 190 P.2d at
3. The terms "absolute" and "strict" liability were used interchangeably in 1948. Id.
However, the absolute liability attached to the performance of ultrahazardous activities is
more stringent than "strict liability." While both forms of liability attach liability without
fault, a defendant possesses narrower defenses when he has performed an ultrahazardous
activity. See generally 1d. at 495-96, 190 P.2d at 7; compare 4 WITKrN, SUMMARY OF CALI-
FORNIA LAW § 802 (8th ed. 1974) (ultrahazardous activity) with id. §§ 835-840 (strict liabil-
ity).
1978]
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While California utilities have always been governed by the laws of
negligence,2" the standard of care imposed has not been consistently
defined. An appellate court, in Holmes v. Southern California Edison
Co. ,21 permitted the use of a jury instruction which imposed "the high-
est or utmost degree of care in the construction, maintenance and oper-
ation of said wire."'22  However, Polk v. City of Los Angeles23 gives
perhaps the best definition: "Among the circumstances [to be consid-
ered] are the well known dangerous character of electricity and the in-
herent risk of injury to persons or property if it escapes. . . . Hence
the care used must be commensurate with and proportionate to that
danger."'24
These still viable liability standards set for California utilities were
defined well before the historic decision of Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.25 which established the doctrine that manufacturers
should be held strictly liable for injuries caused by their products.
26 Of
course, most products automatically fall under the Greenman doctrine.
However, in the past, utility service had always been classified as just
that, a service,27 and hence has escaped the Greenman doctrine. Until
recently, traditional negligence liability standards were in effect and
19. 31 Cal. 2d at 499, 190 P.2d at 7 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 523, Comment d
(1938)).
20. The development of utility tort liability in California has generally paralleled its de-
velopment in the great majority ofjurisdictions which also base such liability on the laws of
negligence. One interesting exception to the general pattern occurred in Maryland where,
for a time, strict liability was imposed on electricity pursuant to the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher, 19 L.T.R. (n.s.) 220 (H.L. 1868). The concept was applied as follows:
The basic concept underlying the rule [of Rylands v. Fletcher] is that a person who
elects to keep orbring upon his land something which exposes the adjacent land or its
owner or occupant to an added danger should be obliged to prevent its doing damage.
So, it follows that if the escape be of oil, gas, electricity. . . and damage is done to an
adjacent property, the occupier is within the rule.
Toy v. Atlantic Gulf& Pac. Co., 176 Md. 197, 213, 4 A.2d 757, 765 (1939) (emphasis added).
However, Maryland has discontinued use of this theory, and its utilities are governed by
the laws of negligence at this time. See generally Southern Md. Elec. Co op. v. Blanchard,
239 Md. 481, 212 A.2d 301 (1965).
In California, the Rylands doctrine of ultrahazardous activity (as applied to electric utili-
ties) was dismissed by McKenzie v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 731, 736, 19
Cal. Rptr. 628, 631 (1962) and has not been seriously considered by subsequent cases.
21. 78 Cal. App. 2d 43, 177 P.2d 32 (1947).
22. Id. at 55, 177 P.2d at 39.
23. 26 Cal. 2d 519, 159 P.2d 931 (1945).
24. Id. at 525, 159 P.2d at 934.
25. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
26. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
27. See CAL. PUB. UmI.. CODE § 2775 (West Supp. 1978) ("No electrical or gas corpora-
tion which reduces or discontinues service. . . .") (emphasis added).
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not questioned.28
A. Product or Service?
The logical beginning for this discussion is to determine whether a
utility supplies a product cognizable in strict liability. The distinction
between product and service is crucial; providers of services are not
held strictly liable for defects in their performance.2 1 Since no Califor-
nia case has ever defined electricity as either a product or a service,
discussion and application of traditional product/service criteria is nec-
essary.
The extremes on the California product/service continuum stand out
fairly well. In Allied Products v. John -1. Blume & Associates,30 the
defendant was hired to conduct a study of the engineering feasibility of
constructing a small boat pier in front of the plaintiffs hotel. For vari-
ous reasons the engineering study was defective, and the pier was of
little use to the hotel's patrons. The court had no difficulty in coming
28. Two post- Greenman cases, Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 496 P.2d
1276, 101 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1972) and Scally v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 23 Cal. App. 3d 806,
100 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1972), decided issues which determined the liability of electric utilities
for injuries proximately caused by the supply of electricity without mentioning strict liabil-
ity. See also Williams v. Detorit Edison Co., 63 Mich. App. 559, 572, 234 N.W.2d 702, 709
(1975), wherein the court stated that "California continues to hold its electric power line
companies to the standard of reasonable care under the circumstances."
29. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481,487,275 P.2d 15,20 (1954); Swett v. Gribaldo, Jones
& Assocs., 40 Cal. App. 3d 573, 575-76, 115 Cal. Rptr. 99, 101 (1974). Actions brought on
the theory of strict liability in tort look to the pre-Greenman case of Gagne for authority that
a supplier of services will not be held liable for injuries suffered in connection with those
services in the absence of fault. Although the Gagne case was decided with respect to im-
plied warranty and not strict liability in tort, it is clear that the somewhat similar theories
employ the same criteria in determining whether a particular transaction is the transfer of a
product or the supplying of a service. Thus, Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assocs.,
25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 855, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259, 263 (1972) could speak of warranty and strict
liability in the same breath while stating that services were not meant to be included in
either doctrine. Other courts are in agreement with the Allied Properties view:
Under California law, whether plaintiff brought her suit against [defendant] on the
theory of breach of implied warranty or strict liability, "the basic elements to be proved
[under either theory] are the same." This Circuit has similarly held that "under either
approach [breach of implied warranty or strict liability] the elements remain the same."
Ahus "[t]he difference is largely one of terminology."
Angle v. Sky Chef, Inc., 535 F.2d 492,495 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer
& Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424,433,79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (1969) and Davis v. Wyeth Labora-
tories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 126 (9th Cir. 1976), respectively). See also Shepard v. Alexian
Bros. Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 615, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132, 137 (1973); Balido v. Improved
Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 640-41, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 895 (1972). The implied
warranty and strict liability theories differ, in essence, only as to the purpose for which they
are applied. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 15, 403 P.2d 145, 149,45 Cal. Rptr. 17,
21 (1965).
30. 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1972).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
to the conclusion that engineering studies were pure services and em-
ployed the well settled rule in California "that where the primary ob-
jective of a transaction is to obtain services, the doctrines of implied
warranty and strict liability do not apply."3' One of the clearest illus-
trations of the dichotomy between product and service in California is
illustrated by Stuart v. Crestview Mutual Water Co.32 There, the devel-
oper of tract homes installed a defective water system and was held
strictly liable, but the engineer designing the system was not subject to
liability in the absence of negligence.33 Thus, in those situations where
the product element clearly predominates over the service element in
producing an injury, the courts will find the tort-feasor within the
bounds of strict liability.34 For example, an owner of a laundromat
providing a clothes cleaning "service" to the public was liable as a li-
censor for injuries resulting from defective products furnished to the
public for their use.35
Arthur Dunne, writing on strict liability in California, views the
product/service precedents as falling into three main categories,
namely: (1) where purely professional or advisory services are per-
formed; (2) where a product is used by the supplier in the performance
of a service; and (3) where in the course of supplying a service, the
customer is given a product to use.36 The probability that a court will
find that a product exists for the purposes of strict liability increases as
the factual situation travels the continuum from category one to
three.37 For example, an engineering study38 belongs in category one;
the use of a defective needle in the performance of medical services
illustrates category two; 39 and the supply of furniture by a landlord40 is
an example of the third.
A more liberal means of analyzing the product/service problem, fa-
vored by some courts and numerous writers, is the application of strict
31. Id. at 855, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 264. See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
32. 34 Cal. App. 3d 802, 110 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1973).
33. Id. at 811, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
34. See Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973); Newmark v.
Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 246 A.2d 11 (1968). In the latter case a hairdresser was held
strictly liable for an injury which resulted when he used a defective shampoo in the perform-
ance of his "service."
35. Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 325-26, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423 (1970).
36. A. DuNNE, PRODUCTs LiABiLrrY: CALIFoRNIA DOCTRINE OF STRicr LIABILITY § 40
(1974) [hereinafter cited as DuNNE].
37. Id.
38. Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assocs., 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259
(1972).
39. Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971).
40. Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1972).
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liability where the transfer or use of a harmful product has occurred,
even though there is also a strong "service" element in the overall
transaction. It has been reasoned that when a product changes hands
within a commercial relationship, "[t]he additional element of service
should not logically preclude the application of a warranty."'"
Professor Reynolds, an advocate of this latter method of analysis,
used electricity to demonstrate the point: "Thus, if unmerchantable
electricity is supplied by a utility, breach of implied warranty may be
found. In such a case, the essence-perhaps the entirety-of the 'serv-
ice' performed consists of transfer of a product."42 This analysis ap-
pears to represent the current-trend of thought on the product/service
issue.43
Nevertheless, there is much authority in California that the mere
transfer of a defective product while performing a service will not auto-
matically make one strictly liable in tort. A doctor who prescribes a
drug which is alleged to be defective will not be held liable on a strict
liability theory.44 A hospital which supplies blood to a patient will not
be held strictly liable for supplying defective blood.45 However, a key
factor in the court's decision in the latter instance which is missing
when applied to utilities is the fact that "a hospital is not engaged in the
business of distributing blood to the public and does notput the blood
on the market in order toproit therefrom." While, like a hospital, the
business of an electric utility is cloaked in the public interest,47 a util-
ity's business consists solely of selling electricity to the public.
It is difficult to escape Professor Reynold's conclusion that "the es-
sence-perhaps the entirety-of the 'service' performed consists of the
transfer of a product. '48 The services performed by the utility are inci-
41. Reynolds, Strict Liabilityfor Commercial Services- Wll4nother Citadel Crumble?, 30
OKLA. L. Rnv. 298, 308 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Reynolds]. See note 29 supra.
42. Reynolds, supra note 41, at 308.
43. See generally Note, Application of Strict Liabiliy To Repairers: -4 Proposalfor Legisla-
tiveAction in the Face ofJudicialInaction, 8 PAC. L.J. 865 (1977); Note, Sales-Service Hybrid
Transactions.rA Policy ,pproach, 28 Sw. LJ. 575 (1974); Note, Products and the Professional-
Strict Liability in the Sales-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 111 (1972).
44. Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 979, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 393 (1971).
45. Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 610, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132, 134
(1973).
46. Id. at 611, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (emphasis in original). While it is true that CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (West 1970) played a large role in the court's decision, it
would be a mistake to ignore the excellent product-service analysis in the court's opinion.
33 Cal. App. 3d at 609-11, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 133-35.
47. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 361 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
48. Reynolds, supra note 41, at 308.
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dental and supplemental to the transfer of electricity. Usually the con-
sumer has personal contact with the utility only when utility linemen
come to restore the supply of electricity when lines have been damaged,
or to start and stop the flow of electricity to his residence. Thus, the
furnishing of electricity is unlike the benefit performed by engineers,
doctors, architects and others, who if using a "product" at all, do so
only as incidental to their personal efforts.
Furthermore, "[i]n recent years there has been a marked trend to-
ward the placement of 'hybrid' product service transactions in the no-
fault category."4 9 While it is true that electricity has always been char-
acterized as a service, that characterization has merely been assumed.
It has never been significant until now that such a characterization had
been made, as the law of negligence covered both concepts. Before
making a final conclusion on whether furnishing of electricity is a serv-
ice or a product in California, it would be beneficial to see how other
jurisdictions have treated this issue.
An Indiana case, Helvey v. Wabash Counly REMC,50 held that elec-
tricity was a "good" subject to the Uniform Commercial Code. After
determining that electricity was "(1) a thing; (2) existing; and (3) mova-
ble" 1 the court concluded that "[l]ogic would indicate that whatever
can be measured in order to establish the price to be paid would be
indicative of fulfilling both the existing and movable requirements of
goods."5 2 It is interesting to note that Helvey relied on two very old
California cases53 in coming to its conclusion. However, those cases
have never been cited by a modem California court for the proposition
that electricity is a "good" or a product subject to implied warranty or
strict liability laws.
Helvey's applicability to strict liability actions was assured by the
later Indiana case of Petroski v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.
54
Defendant had conceded that electricity, once it reached the con-
49. Note, Sales-Service Hybrid Transactions: A Policy Approach, 28 Sw. L.J. 575, 585
(1974).
50. 151 Ind. App. 176, 278 N.E.2d 608 (1972).
51. Id. at 179, 278 N.E.2d at 610.
52. Id.
53. Id.
It may be regarded as a solecism to say that one may own a thing not susceptible ofdefinition and the nature and character of which is practically unknown, yet when one
gathers from the elements an energy or force which he may store, transmit, and utilize,
he thereby appropriates to his own use that thing, whatever it may be, and it is a subject
of ownership, ofbarer and sale, so long as it is in his possession.
Hill v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 22 Cal. App. 788, 806, 136 P. 492, 500 (1913) (quoting
Terrace Water Co. v. San Antonio Light & Power Co., I Cal. App. 511, 82 P. 562 (1905)).
54. 354 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
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sumer's home or place of business, might be a product subject to Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 402A.55  The court was unequivocal:
Electricity is a product which can be sold within the meaning of § 402A
* . .Furthermore, a literal "sale" of goods is not necessary for application
of § 402A ... the test is not whether there has been a technical sale but
rather whether the product has been placed in the stream of commerce.
5 6
Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., ' a Michigan appellate case, took a
different approach. In that case the boom of a back hoe struck and
felled a power line which then electrocuted the deceased. The court
analyzed the product/service issue in this manner:
At the outset of our discussion, we note that the "product" involved in
this case is not a tangible item like an automobile, punch press or Coca-
Cola bottle. Rather, it is a form of energy which in this case consisted of
7600 volts traveling in an uncovered line about 28 feet above the ground.
Electrici y is a service rather than a "good," but the doctrine of implied
warranty has been held to apply to its sale.
58
The court concluded that "the doctrine of implied warranty in tort
applies to a 'products' liability case involving electricity."59 In the fi-
nal analysis the Williams court refused to apply implied warranty be-
55. Id. at 747. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) sets out the general
definition for strict liability. It reads as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
56. 354 N.E.2d at 747.
57. 63 Mich. App. 559, 234 N.W.2d 702 (1975).
58. Id. at 564, 234 N.W.2d at 705 (emphasis added) (citing Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972). Cf. Insurance Co. of N.
America v. Radiant Elec. Co., 55 Mich. App. 410, 222 N.W.2d 323 (1974) (implied warranty
applicable to installation and delivery of electric services).
59. 63 Mich. App. at 565, 234 N.W.2d at 706. Michigan is a jurisdiction without a strict
liability doctrine, relying instead on the theory of implied warranty in tort to encompass the
dual purposes of recovery for economic loss and for personal injury wrongful death. Id. at
568-69 n.4, 234 N.W.2d at 707-08 n.4 (1975).
While California differs from Michigan in that the doctrine of implied warranty or strict
liability would not apply to services, it is probable that the court in Williams would have
determined that electricity was a "product" if strict liability were a viable doctrine in Michi-
gan. This conclusion is derived from the court's own language describing this case as a
"products liability" case. The reference to injuries involving electricity as a "products lia-
bility" case would seem to undermine the fust conclusion of Williams that electricity is a
service. See note 62 infra.
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cause there was no transfer of the product from the manufacturer into
the stream of commerce.
60
All other cases which have refused to apply strict liability to the torts
of electric utilities have done so on grounds other than a belief that
utilities provide a service rather than a product.61 Most cases simply
assume that electricity is a product of sorts and base their analysis on
other grounds.
62
Adding the decisions of outside jurisdictions which have not had
much difficulty in determining that electricity is a "product," or at least
will be treated as such, to the previous analysis of product/service
transactions in California, it appears likely that the California courts
will construe the delivery of electricity as a "product" transaction.
However, the classification of electricity as a product is most certainly
not the end of this discussion. There still remain the questions con-
cerning the nature of "defective" electricity and the point in the distri-
bution process at which electricity enters the stream of commerce and
becomes a product.
B. What is "Defective" Electricity?
Formulating a workable definition of "defective electricity" is an ob-
stacle to the imposition of strict liability in tort for injuries caused by
electricity. However, it is an obstacle that can be overcome.
In August of 1971, a football coach in a southern Texas school dis-
trict attempted to erect football goal posts for the upcoming season.
The goal posts were constructed of iron pipe and had been welded to-
gether some distance from their intended placement. In order to get
the goal posts to the field, the football coach and five other persons
began "walking" the "H" shaped goal post to the field. In so doing,
60. Id. at 567-68, 234 N.W.2d at 707. See notes 96-109 infra and accompanying text.
61. See, eg., Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 M. 2d 456,463,343 N.E.2d 465,469 (1976)
("Assuming, arguendo, that electricity is a 'product'.. . ."); Erwin v. Guadalupe Valley
Elec. Coop., 505 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974) ("Even if it be assumed that the
doctrine of products liability extends to the sale of electricity. .. ").
62. For the most part, analogous utilities such as natural gas suppliers and water districts
have not considered whether their commodities should be classified as a service or a product
and generally are not liable in the absence of fault. See 29 CAL. JUR. 3d Electricity, Gas and
Steam §§ 26-32 (1976); Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d §§ 1-3 (1968) (The doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher is applicable in only a few states.). But see Moody v. City of Galveston, 524
S.W.2d 583 (Tex. CL App. 1975) in which a water utility was held strictly liable for contami-
nation of its water supply. Telephone companies are presumed to supply a service not
cognizable under the doctrines of strict liability and implied warranty. See generally Gau-
tier v. General Tel. Co., 234 Cal. App. 2d 302, 44 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1965).
Although the scope of this comment only includes electric utilities, the concepts expressed
herein would for the most part apply to other utilities.
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one of the uprights came in contact with an uninsulated wire. The
coach and one other person were killed, and the remaining four men
were burned in varying degrees.63 A wrongful death action was filed
against the local utility, the complaint alleging in part:
(1) The. . . "electrical product in question in this case. . ." was defec-
tive in that the ". . . wires were too low." (2) The product was also de-
fective because defendant failed to warn the public in general, and the six
men who were moving the goal posts in particular, of the dangers in-
volved in ".... coming within the zone of danger of the product."'
The court held: "Even if it be assumed that the doctrine of products
liability extends to the sale of electricity, it was incumbent on plaintiffs,
if they seek the protection of the doctrine embodied in Section 402A of
the Restatement. . . to show a defect in the electricity.' '65
The allegations concerning the wires fared no better in the court's
opinion: "Again the unreasonable risk of injury was created, not as a
result of any alleged defect in the wire, but, according to the petition,-
by the fact that the wire was not placed high enough above the
ground."
66
The problem in formulating an adequate definition for the term "de-
fective product," as evidenced by the case above, is a problem that has
plagued all courts attempting to set guidelines for the imposition of
strict liability. Perhaps a workable, all-encompassing definition of de-
fect will never be achieved.67 Yet, such a definition is the foundation
of all strict liability. "The predication of the manufacturer's liability
on a defect in the product precludes compensation for injuries from the
use of non-defective products. Thus the manufacturer's liability de-
pends on what is meant by defective.9
68
Consideration of the common definitions of "defect" and their appli-
cation to the generation of electricity reveals several criteria for deter-
63. Erwin v. Guadalupe Valley Elec. Coop., 505 S.W.2d 353, 354 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
64. Id. at 355.
65. Id. at 355-56.
66. Id. at 356.
67. Although a substantive definition of defect may be difficult to arrive at, the procedu-
ral allegations are well known in California. A plaintiff need only allege that a defective
product proximately caused his injury. Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 121,534 P.2d 377,
387, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681, 691 (1975). A plaintiff need not allege that he was unaware of the
defect nor does the defect have to be one that subjects the user or a bystander to an unrea-
sonable risk of harm. Id See also Luque v. McClean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104
Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972) (plaintiff not required to prove lack of awareness of defect).
68. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liabiity, 32 TENN.
L. Rv. 363, 366 (1965).
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mining defectiveness. 6 9  Deviation from the norm of safety is a
frequently used definition. If an item is poorly constructed or missing
a vital part and thereby causes injury, the particular product deviates
from the norm of safety evidenced by properly constructed products.
However, this criterion has been criticized as over-inclusive,70 since the
product can deviate from the norm and still not be defective, depend-
ing on the level of standards set for the "norm of safety."
Another well-known definition states that a defective product is one
"unfit for its ordinary purpose or use." 71 This theory is somewhat lim-
ited in its application because of the inherent requirement that the
product be used in a foreseeable manner at the time of the injury. This
test requires a judgment by the jury with respect to the knowledge that
the manufacturer should have had with respect to potential uses of the
product and any injuries likely to result from such use.
The application of the "unfit for use" theory is obviously limited
when applied to the supplying of electricity. The "product" is being
used only when it reaches the consumer's residence or business. This
theory cannot encompass those accidents which happen prior to the
time of the electricity's intended use.
Arthur Dunne has attempted to state an exhaustive definition of a
defective product in California.72 The elements of this definition are:
(a) the condition of the product must cause harm to person or property
when properly used; (b) the condition of the product has an unsafe
aspect which could be eliminated or made safer without affecting the
planned use of the product; (c) the defect can stem from material,
workmanship, design; (d) the defect need be one which renders a prod-
uct unreasonably dangerous; (e) no elements of negligence need be
present; and (f) the defect may be created after the product leaves the
supplier by the supplier's failure to perceive possible conditions which
make the product unsafe.73
Two allegations are generally made which attempt to fit the supply
of electricity into these traditional definitions: one, that the electricity
69. "Defect becomes a fiction, however, if it means nothing more than a condition caus-
ing physical injury." Id. at 372 (emphasis in original).
70. Id. at 367.
71. This theory has been borrowed from the doctrine of implied warranty of
merchantability. Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 384,482 P.2d 681,684, 93
Cal. Rptr. 769, 772 (1971).
72. DUNNE, su.pra note 36, at § 47. Other excellent treatments of the defect issue can be
found in Phillips, The Standardfor Determining Deectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U.
Cn. L. RFv. 101 (1977); 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[4][t][i]
(1978).
73. DuNNE, supra note 36, at § 47.
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per se is defective; or, more commonly, that the instrumentalities sup-
plying the electricity are defective. The former allegation is limited to
those rare instances where the current supplied is either so abnormally
powerful or so weak that damage results to property. This type of de-
fect allegation fits easily into the "deviation from the norm" definition
but its use would appear to be so limited by the rarity of the condition
and minimal resulting damage as to not warrant further discussion
here. Furthermore, this type of allegation precludes strict liability for
"black-outs." There is nothing defective about the electricity during a
blackout; if liability can be imposed at all, it is because some aspects of
the utility's operations are deficient.
Most injuries and property damage caused by electricity occur in sit-
uations where the electricity has merely conformed to the laws of na-
ture. The allegation that the wires or poles are defective for having
allowed the electricity to "escape" usually fails. Generally, the utilities
are not the entities which have manufactured these items for sale; in-
deed if they have manufactured them at all, it has only been for their
own use.74 The courts, in order to uphold such allegations, would ei-
ther have to view the power lines as the "packaging" of the electricity
or rationalize that items such as the power lines are so necessary to
supplying electricity that for all practical purposes the power lines and
the electric force are the same item.
Holding a manufacturer liable for injuries caused by the packaging
of his product is not an uncommon theory.75 However, one out-of-
state electric utility case which dealt with a packaging theory, Genaust
v. Illinois Power Co. ,76 rejected that theory summarily as illogical and
distorting the meaning of "package" beyond any ordinarily understood
meaning.77 Even the liberal California judicial system would be reluc-
tant to stretch the clear meaning of the word "package" to encompass
situations involving utility wires. On the other hand, the idea that the
power lines and electrical force constitute the same item might be
slightly more palatable in California. Although this premise is scien-
tifically inaccurate, the California courts are not adverse to creating
legal fictions to serve practical purposes.78 If California courts were
willing to go this far, some of the standard definitions of defect would
74. Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 II1. 2d 456, 464, 343 N.E.2d 465, 470 (1976). For a
discussion of the Genaust decision see Note, 26 Dn PAUL L. REv. 401 (1977).
75. See cases listed in Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 350 (1962).
76. 62 IM. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976).
77. Id. at 464, 343 N.E.2d at 470.
78. An employer's imputed negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior is a
good example of this practice; constructive trust is another. See Hinman v. Westinghouse
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be applicable to situations where electricity causes an injury. For ex-
ample, if an injury was caused by a lack of insulation or faulty insula-
tion on a distribution wire, the courts could very well apply a theory
based on deviation from the normal insulation of distribution wires.
Two standards used in determining whether a product is defective
remain to be analyzed. In certain situations failure to warn of a dan-
gerous condition will constitute a product defect79 and in other situa-
tions a defective design is a basis for strict liability. 0
The "failure to warn of a dangerous condition" theory works well
when applied to traditional products but is not practical when applied
to utilities. For example, adequate warning is required of a drug man-
ufacturer so that his product does not cause injurious side effects to
persons who would have used the drug correctly or abstained from its
use had they known of its potential danger.8" This warning is required
whenever the manufacturer knows or should have known about the
danger.8 2 Of course, it can hardly be disputed that utility personnel
know that their "product" is potentially dangerous to people who hap-
pen to be close to a source of electric current. Is a warning required
upon penalty of strict liability, for example, that the charge "stored" in
uninsulated power lines may arc if a conductive material comes within
a specified distance? Cases which have dealt with the subject when
attempting to determine the applicability of strict liability have held
that such a danger is common knowledge.8" At present, California
does not require a manufacturer to warn of potential dangers which are
generally known and recognized in a product 4 Therefore, strict lia-
Elec. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 956, 471 P.2d 988, 88 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1970) (respondeat superior); Elliot
v. Elliot, 231 Cal. App. 2d 205, 41 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1964) (constructive trust).
79. See, ag., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 64, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 45, 53 (1973) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965)); Canifax v.
Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 53, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 558 (1965).
80. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
235 (1978). See also Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465,475, 467 P.2d 229, 236, 85
Cal Rptr. 629, 636 (1970).
81. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 710-11, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398,
414 (1967). The court further commented: "But where the facts disclose that the drug has
not been properly prepared or has been placed upon the market and sold without adequate
and proper warning, strict liability for resulting injury may be found." Id Tooe involved
a situation where the manufacturer knew of dangerous side effects, yet gave no warning.
82. Id. at 710, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 413. The negligence concept expressed in the text can be
recognized immediately. This concept has been engrafted onto the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity for a failure to warn and remains to this day. Midgley v. S.S. Kresge Co., 55 Cal. App.
3d 67, 73, 127 Cal. Rptr. 217, 221 (1976).
83. Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 1l. 2d 456, 466, 343 N.E.2d 465, 471 (1976); Stam-
baugh v. Central Ill. Light Co., 42 Ml. App. 3d 582, 587, 356 N.E.2d 148, 152 (1976).
84. Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 934, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483, 485
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bility for failure to warn appears useful only when imposed for a defec-
tive method of warning.
85
The decision as to whether or not a duty to warn exists is determined
by a policy judgment which applies equally to negligence and strict
liability. 6 Once the policy decision is made that all dangerous condi-
tions created by the transmission of electricity must be warned against,
only then is strict liability of importance in determining whether or not
to hold the utility liable in the absence of fault. The duty to warn
imposed on manufacturers of products is one which is inherent in the
doctrine of strict liability; manufacturers have an obligation either to
provide safe products or bear the losses for failing to do so.8 7  How-
ever, no such universal duty has been imposed on the suppliers of elec-
tricity; for example, electric utilities are not under a duty to insulate
their transmission and distribution lines in all areas at all times.88
Thus, the question of duty as applied to dangerous conditions created
by electric utilities must be made on a case-by-case basis. An adequate
definition for defective electricity cannot find its roots in the "failure to
warn" theory.
There still remains the question of defective design. Plaintiffs could
be expected to set forth various allegations concerning defective design.
For example, a claim might be made that underground placement of
(1976). But see Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7 Cal. 3d 170, 178, 496 P.2d 1276, 1281,
101 Cal. Rptr. 908, 913 (1972) where the court in a negligence action indicated that utilities
have a duty to warn persons of the danger of coming in contact with the light bulb on a
utility light pole.
85. For discussion of liability in California for failure to warn, see Midgley v. S.S. Kresge
Co., 55 Cal. App. 3d 67, 127 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1976).
A rule imposing an obligation upon a manufacturer (or seller) to give a suitable warn-
ing and a rule conditioning labilty upon the fact of knowledge or reason to acquire
knowledge are rules fixing duties o care. Since violation of a duty of care has always
been an element in the definition of negligence, the rules expressed in commentj of the
new Restatement [Torts, § 402A], although stated as an adjunct to "strict" liability are
merely well stated rules already a part of the law of negligence.
Id. at 72, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (quoting and relying on-Oakes v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 650 n.4, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 n.4 (1969).
86. Id See note 85 supra.
87. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
88. Scally v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 23 Cal. App. 3d 806, 815-16, 100 Cal. Rptr. 501, 507
(1972). Thus, the statement in Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 53,46
Cal. Rptr. 552, 558 (1965) "that a product, although faultlessly made may nevertheless be
deemed 'defective' under the rule and subject the supplier thereof to strict liability if it is
unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the hands of a user without a suitable warn-
ing.. ." is only applicable when a duty to provide a safe product under all foreseeable
circumstances has been assumed. Midgley v. S.S. Kresge Co., 55 Cal. App. 3d 67, 72, 127
Cal. Rptr. 217, 220 (1976).
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dangerous power lines is a feasible design alternative.8 9 If California
desired not to follow the Genaust theory,9" a plaintiff might assert that
the electrical product was contained in a defectively designed "pack-
age."
The California Supreme Court has recently restated its definition of
design defect. A design is defective:
(1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner, or
(2) if the plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused his
injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors
discussed above, that on balance the benefits of the challenged design
outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.91
The first definition is of little use for electrical accidents which occur
outside the home or business, since by its terms the defmition applies
only to a "used" product. However, the second definition does not
depend on use and analytically could be applied to any situation in
which electricity is considered a product if one also considers such
items as conductors and poles as part of the product or its packaging.
Because the power lines and other instrumentalities used in the trans-
mission of electricity are not intended for public use, they realistically
cannot be considered products themselves.92 As stated above in the
discussion of the Genaust case,93 Illinois has rejected the packaging
theory as a possible means of establishing product defect; the theory
gains no more credence when employed in the area of design defect.
However, it is arguable that the California Supreme Court might con-
sider the electricity itself and the instrumentalities used in its transmis-
sion to be so interrelated as to be one and the same item for liability
purposes.94 Thus, a defect in the design of one would comprise a de-
89. See text following note 148 infra.
90. See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
91. Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,435,573 P.2d 443,457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
239-40 (1978). The "relevant factors" referred to by the court include:
[t]he gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such dan-
ger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial
cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the
consumer that would result from an alternative design.
Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
92. Cratsley v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 38 l. App. 3d 55, 58, 347 N.E.2d 496, 499
(1976).
93. See notes 76-77 supra~nd accompanying text.
94. At this point, one can only predict such a holding. However, given the "expansion-
ist" mood of the California Supreme Court, it would not be beyond their reasoning to create
a "scientific" fiction for liability purposes. Strict liability in tort has been continuously
expanded in scope and definition since its inception in Greenman. See, e.g., Price v. Shell
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fect in the other. Therefore, under the "non-use" theory of design de-
fect, judgment could be had upon a showing that a proper or more
feasible design would have mitigated dangerous conditions in the util-
ity's delivery system. Such a holding would have a great effect on elec-
tric utility liability especially since a utility was formerly held liable
only upon proof of negligent construction or misplacement of wires. 95
C. Stream of Commerce
Having established that electricity may be considered a product and
possibly a defective one, the crucial issue in determining whether strict
liability can be imposed, and perhaps the insurmountable barrier to its
imposition in most cases, is the determination of the time at which elec-
tricity becomes a product for the purpose of strict liability. That is,
when does it enter the stream of commerce? Possible answers can be
found at various stages: the time of generation at the plant; subsequent
to the last distribution substation; or after it reaches the meter and en-
ters the consumer's home or place of business. Only the last alterna-
tive meets the requirements of traditional strict liability law. With one
possible exception,96 the courts willing to call electricity a product have
been unwilling to determine that it is a product until it reaches the
point of intended consumption.97 The reasons for this are twofold:
Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970) (expansion of strict liability to
lessors of personal property); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84,
75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (bystanders injured by a product being used by another allowed to
allege a strict liability theory). For the recent definitional expansion of strict liability occur-
ring in Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., see note 91 supra and accompanying text. Once a plaintiff
has demonstrated the product caused his injury, the defendant now has the burden of prov-
ing that there was no feasible design alternative, or the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
product failed to perform according to an ordinary consumer's expectations when used in a
foreseeable manner. 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38. But
see Daly v. General Motors, 20 Cal. 3d 725, 737, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
386 (1978) where a divided court contracted a plaintiffs recovery by mandating that a plain-
tiffs comparative fault reduce his recovery.
95. See notes 12-20 supra and accompanying text.
96. Kulhanjian v. Detroit Edison Co., 73 Mich. App. 347, 251 N.W.2d 580 (1977). See
notes 104-09 infra and accompanying text.
97. See Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 M11. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976); Petroski v.
Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 354 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Williams v. Detroit
Edison Co., 63 Mich. App. 559, 234 N.W.2d 702 (1975); Buckeye Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Detroit Edison Co., 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972); Kemp v. Wisconsin Elec.
Power Co., 44 Wis. 2d 571, 172 N.W.2d 161 (1969). See also Troszynski v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 42 M11. App. 3d 925, 356 N.E.2d 926 (1976), where, in a case decided after
Genaust, the court allowed a claim based on strict liability against a utility where the plain-
tiff came into contact with a live uninsulated electric wire within the utility's meter box.
Strangely, the Troszynski court did not refer to the Genaust decision except for an assump-
tion of the risk issue. 42 111. App. 3d at 93, 356 N.E.2d at 932. It appeared as if the utility
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first, until passing through the meter, the electricity has not been re-
leased from its conductors for its intended use; second, the poles and
wires are instrumentalities being used by, and in the control of, the
utility and not in the stream of commerce.
The Michigan case of Buckeye Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Detroit
Edison Co.98 explicitly stated that electricity is not a product for im-
plied warranty (strict liability) purposes until it flows through the
meter.99 Wisconsin also rejected the application of strict liability on
the same grounds where a boy was electrocuted when wires attached to
a model airplane came in contact with uninsulated power lines.100
Such reasoning is not contrary to the logic of strict liability in or out
of California. Suppose an analogous utility, a water utility, constructs
a dam for the storage of water. Some years later a boy walks on part
of the dam and falls into the water and drowns. Certainly, the stored
water is the utility's "product" when it reaches the consumer. But it is
not rational to call the stored water into which the boy fell a product
"in the stream of commerce" merely because it probably will be a prod-
uct at some time in the future. The water was not intended for use in
this manner; indeed, it was not being used at all. Hence, any action
filed against the utility would have to be based on the negligence the-
ory of "attractive nuisance".
Indiana reaches the same result as Michigan and Wisconsin but with
a slight twist in reasoning. 01 In a case where a fourteen year-old boy
climbing a tree was injured when he touched a live wire running
through the upper branches, the appellate court held:
Technically, until the electricity reaches its destination in a home or fac-
tory, it is transmitted by equipment over lines under the exclusive control
of NIPSCO [electric company]. The electric company's transmission and
distribution lines are not a part of the end product which reaches the con-
sumer as in the case of bottles and cans which are a part of the finished
product. Since NIPSCO had not yet placed its product in the stream of
commerce, a judgment [adverse to plaintiffs] on the evidence on the issue
of strict liability is proper in the case at bar.102
had conceded the point that the electricity had become a product in the stream of commerce
once it reached the meter, as the product/service issue was not mentioned in the court's
opinion.
98. 38 Mich. App. 325, 196 N.W.2d 316 (1972).
99. Id. at 330 nA, 196 N.W.2d at 318 n.4.
100. Kemp v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 44 Wis. 2d 571, 582-83, 172 N.W.2d 161, 166
(1969).
101. Petroski v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 354 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
102. Id. at 747.
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Clearly, the "defect" which the plaintiff brought to the court's attention
was merely the misplacement of power lines. The court viewed the
lines as instrumentalities by which the electricity is transmitted, and
which are never intended to be placed in the stream of commerce. As
such, the lines are not products. 103 Using the water utility analogy de-
veloped previously, suppose the boy fell into the water due to a defec-
tively constructed concrete walkway which collapsed. The" concrete
which partially gave way, although defective, was only an instrumen-
tality used by the water utility in connection with its business. The
walkway itself certainly is not in the stream of commerce.
One recent Michigan case, however, has digressed from the view that
electricity becomes a product only at the meter. °4 An appellate court
decision, Kulhanjian v. Detroit Edison Co.,"' decided after Buckeye
Union (which had expressed its opinion that implied warranty (strict
liability)"°s would not attach until the electricity had entered the
meter),0 7 expanded the area and held that Detroit Edison had im-
pliedly warranted the manner in which wires had been installed above
private property.'08 This holding gave virtually no emphasis to the
stream of commerce argument espoused by Williams.'0 9 Indeed, from
the way the opinion is worded, it appears that an electric utility would
be strictly liable for injuries caused by the manner in which all wires
passing over private property were installed Therefore, Kulhanjian ap-
103. Id. It is important to note that the courts' decisions in these cases are not based on
the fact that a bystander rather than an intended user is the person injured. Like California
(Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969)),
Indiana does not require that "a literal 'sale' of goods is necessary for application of section
402A [of the Restatement 2d of Torts]." 354 N.E.2d at 747. See notes 54-56 supra and
accompanying text. Similarly, the court in Williams v. Detroit Edison Co., 63 Mich. App.
559, 566 n.1, 234 N.W.2d 702, 706 n.1 (1975), was expressly aware that its implied warranty
(strict liability) laws allow bystanders to recover.
104. Electricity will certainly have entered the stream of commerce once it reaches and
flows through the consumer's meter. In at least one case, a utility appears to have conceded
the point. Troszynski v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 42 M11. App. 3d 925, 256 N.E.2d 926
(1976). See note 97 supra.
105. 73 Mich. App. 347, 251 N.W.2d 580 (1977). Courts speak of a flow of electricity
through the meter. While this might be a useful analogy for liability purposes, one should
keep in mind that electricity does not flow in a manner identical to water. Electron move-
ment in the conductor creates the force which drives electrical appliances. The amount of
force used is measured by the utility's meter. Electrons, of course, are not consumed in this
process.
106. See note 59 supra.
107. 38 Mich. App. at 330 n.4, 196 N.W.2d at 318 n.4.
108. 73 Mich. App. at 356, 251 N.W.2d at 584.
109. 63 Mich. App. at 567, 234 N.W.2d at 707.
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pears directly at odds with its predecessors, Buckeye Union and
Williams.
California requires that a product be placed into the stream of com-
merce before strict liability becomes applicable.110
Where the product has not yet been released for its intended use, the
situation is different. Not only is the prospective supplier as to whom the
use is wrongful the party directly wronged but the factors on which the
Greenman rule rests have not been brought into operation as to anyone in
the chain of supply."'
Users of products in their businesses, whether the products are sold
or leased, are not strictly liable for injuries to others which occur from
the use of the product." 2 While the strict liability originally applied to
a manufacturer has been expanded to retailers, 11 3 lessors, 1 4 bailors, 15
and licensors," 6 it has never been applied to users.
An illustrative example of the requirement for having the product
placed in the stream of commerce appeared in the case of Shook v.
Jacuzzi. 117 There a manufacturer designed and constructed a machine
for use on its premises. Two workmen were injured by this machine
and claimed that its design and construction were defective. Although
the court held that worker's compensation laws barred recovery, it
noted that the "[defendant] did not sell the machine or in any way
place it in the stream of commerce. . . .Its design and construction of
this machine was but auxiliary to its principal manufacturing opera-
tion. As such, it does not subject [the defendant] to products liability
to its employees," '118 or presumably to anyone else."19
110. Shook v. Jacuzzi, 59 Cal. App. 3d 978, 981, 129 Cal. Rptr. 496, 498 (1976).
111. DUNNE, supra note 36, at § 42.
112. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 254, 466 P.2d 722, 728, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 184
(1970).
113. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256,262-63,391 P.2d 168, 171-72,37 Cal.
Rptr. 896, 899-900 (1964).
114. 2 Cal. 3d at 253, 466 P.2d at 727, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 183 (1970).
115. Id.
116. Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 325-26, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423 (1970).
117. 59 Cal. App. 3d 978, 129 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1976).
118. Id. at 981, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 498. California cases holding the designer or installer
of a product placed in a home strictly liable for defective installation are not analogous here.
In those cases, a product not defective in its original manufactured state becomes defective
when installed in a location likely to lead to injury. See, e.g., Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal.
App. 3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973). In essence, the defective installation makes the
larger product, for example, a residence, defective in design. In the case of utilities, there is
no "larger product" which is then sold to the public, as electricity is the only commodity
supplied.
119. However, as soon as utility poles or wires become products in their own right, even if
these products are sold for uses identical to those of the utility, under a recent California
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The use of conductors, poles, and other apparatus by utilities appears
analogous to the principle enunciated by Shook. The poles, wires, and
transformers are not sold to the public. They are merely used in the
conduct of the utilities' business, the supply of electricity. In this
respect, California would seem to fall squarely within the holdings
of Pelroski,120 Buckeye Union, "I and the other out-of-state authorities
which refuse to apply strict liability until the electricity has actually
reached its intended distribution point. As a result, only those acci-
dents which occur subsequent to the passage of electricity through the
meter would subject the utility to strict liability, assuming proximate
cause could be proved. 2
However, strict liability will only become important to society and
the utilities if the distribution point is placed further back than the time
at which the electricity flows through the meter, as in Kulhanjian.12 3
Analytically, such a holding evades traditional strict liability law. Al-
though electricity can be termed a "product" and possibly a "defective
product," it simply does not enter the stream of commerce and become
a product until the electricity passes through the meter. Injuries
caused by electric conductors and poles prior to the time that the elec-
Appellate Court case, the utilities would probably be held strictly liable for injuries caused
by the "products." Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr.
797 (1977). This is so even where the injury is caused by a product which has not been sold
to the public and is still in the control of the utility.
In Douglas, an employee of a winery was injured by defective scaffolding used in the
course and scope of his employment. It was alleged that this scaffolding was sold to the
public. The opinion did not state how much scaffolding was sold to the public or for what
purpose the public was expected to use it. It certainly appeared, and common knowledge
would tell us, that producing scaffolding is not the major business of the Gallo Winery.
The appellate court reversed the sustaining of the demurrer by the trial court and held that
the employer had a "dual status," that of employer and manufacturer, and could be sued by
an employee (and presumably anyone else) in its role as a manufacturer. Shook v. Jacuzzi,
59 Cal. App. 3d 978, 129 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1967), was distinguished on the grounds that the
manufactured machine there in question was created solely for the use of the manufacturer
and had not been sold to the public at all. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 109, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
Such a holding is ominous for those electric utilities which sell used poles, conductors, and
transformers since under Shook, the instrumentalities themselves become products. Even
the utility's own personnel could sue their employer for injuries on the job, not to mention
members of the public injured by these instrumentalities. Unfortunately, the Douglas court
did not discuss the "occasional seller" defense to strict liability actions and one wonders why
it would not be applicable here. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment
f (1965). See also Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 448-49 (10th Cir. 1976)
(applying Missouri law).
120. See notes 101-03 supra and accompanying text.
121. See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Troszynski v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 42 11. App. 3d 925, 356.N.E.2d
926 (1976).
123. See notes 106.09 supra and accompanying text.
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tricity enters the meter should not be cognizable in traditional strict
liability law. Due to these substantial difficulties, any legal fictions
created to fit injuries caused by electricity within a strict liability stan-
dard would require substantial policy reasons.
III. STRICT LIABILITY POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND ELECTRIC
UTILITIES
In refusing to extend strict liability to electric companies in Wood v.
Public Service Co.,124 the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that
"[n]o compelling reason of policy or logic has been advanced to apply
strict liability to electric companies."' 125 This statement leaves one
with the distinct impression that should compelling policy or logical
reasons be advanced, strict liability would be applied. Although there
are serious legal obstacles to the imposition of strict liability for injuries
caused by electric utilities, the law in that area is flexible enough to
accommodate those obstacles. 126  In the final analysis, policy argu-
ments will decide whether to allow claims in strict liability against the
electric utilities. It will be seen that the considerations favoring strict
liability do not measure up to the considerations weighing against the
imposition of strict liability.
A. Traditional Policy Considerations
Since Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. 127 and the adoption of
strict liability in tort, California courts have been willing to expand the
doctrine, continually attempting to make it easier for injured plaintiffs
to be assured of compensation. The application of traditional strict
liability policies without consideration of the unique position of electric
utilities would probably end the question in favor of attaching strict
liability. The Greenman strict liability theory, which has been labeled
as the "deep pockets theory" by a later appellate court decision, 28 re-
mains the primary reason given for expansion of strict liability in Cali-
124. 114 N.H. 182, 317 A.2d 576 (1974).
125. Id. at 189, 317 A.2d at 579-80. Unfortunately, a short statement was the extent of
the court's thought on the subject. No mention was made of the policy arguments which
were considered.
126. "If public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be responsible for their
quality regardless of negligence there is no reason not to fix that responsibility openly."
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
127. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
128. McGoldrick v. Porter-Cable Tools, 34 Cal. App. 3d 885, 891, 110 Cal. Rptr. 481, 484
(1973).
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fornia. Courts should "insure that the cost of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such prod-
ucts on the market rather than by the injured persons who are power-
less to protect themselves."' 12 9 The strict liability imposed upon
manufacturers soon became "enterprise liability" imposed upon the en-
tire marketing enterprise. 130  The idea that anyone involved in the en-
terprise is in a better position to insure against the cost of injuries has
been the focal point of expansion for strict liability. 3'
Another important policy consideration in favor of strict liability is
the need in our technical society to make a plaintiff's task of proving a
case easier.132 Assuming that a manufacturer's overall operations are-
not negligent, it becomes next to impossible to prove that the one-mil-
lionth product which came off the assembly line was negligently manu-
factured. In addition, there is a strong policy in California in favor of
protecting bystanders from injury when the product is being used by
another person. 133 In fact, the bystander is entitled to more protection
because he has less power to protect himself than one who is able to
inspect the product for defects, or one who has at least some control
over use of the product.13 4  Finally, some courts believe that strict lia-
bility is an incentive to improve product safety and induce the realloca-
129. 59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (1963).
130. See notes 113-16 supra and accompanying text.
131. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977) (strict liability
imposed on successor corporation); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85
Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970) (strict liability imposed on lessors of products); Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 CaL 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (distributors as well as
manufacturers liable for a defective product); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App.
2d 224, 74 CaL Rptr. 749 (1969) (tract developer held strictly liable for defective item in
home).
132. See Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978)
(reversing verdict for defendant manufacturer on basis of erroneous instruction requiring
proof that product was unreasonably dangerous); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d
121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972) (hasp manufacturer held strictly liable for
defective product).
133. See Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr.
652 (1969).
134. The Elmore court stated:
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the consumer or
user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably foreseeable. Consumers
and users, at least, have the opportunity to inspect for defects and to limit their
purchases to articles manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by reputable
retailers, whereas the bystander ordinarily has no such opportunities. In short, the
bystander is in greater need of protection from defective products which, are dangerous,
and if any distinction should be made between bystanders and users, it should be made,
contrary to the position of defendants, to extend greater liability in favor of bystanders.
Id. at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
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tion of resources toward safer products.1 5  The rationale of this
conclusion suffers somewhat on analysis. If a product is defective
through no fault of the manufacturer, what is the manufacturer going
to do to make the product safer?
Obviously, the arguments set forth above could be applied to injuries
proximately caused by electric utilities. Theoretically, these arguments
apply to any business transaction which might become involved in per-
sonal injury or property damage tort litigation, and in reality have be-
come almost useless for any distinctive analysis. More useful and less
plaintiff-biased guidelines are needed which will focus the court's at-
tention upon the effect that the imposition of strict liability on an enter-
prise has upon society in general, as well as upon an individual
plaintiff.
136
B. Economic Effects of Strict Liability in Tort
One of the unbiased criteria used in analyzing strict liability closely
examines economic effects.137 When imposing strict liability on a
business entity, courts are fond of the rationale that the manufacturer,
retailer, or lessor is in the best position to absorb or pass on the cost of
injury.1 38 While this is undoubtedly true in the great majority of cases,
it is unfortunate that the courts' analysis stops at that point. There are
burdensome side effects on society when business entities are subject to
the application of strict liability.
A symposium on the economic effects of the then new doctrine of
strict liability in tort was conducted in 1967. Several economists were
asked to present their views on the effects to be expected from the im-
position and expansion of strict liability. The sophisticated economic
135. McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Foundation Blood Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 866,
874, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 448 (1976).
136. See Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict
Tort Liabilityfor Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REv. 803 (1976). The authors' suggested
policy considerations are as follows:
(1) The cost of injuries attributable to the condition of the product about which the
plaintiff complains-the pertinent accident costs.
(2) The incremental cost of marketing the product without the offending condition-the
manufacturer's safety cost.
(3) The loss of functional and psychological.utility occasioned by the elimination of the
offending condition-the publics safety cost.(4) The respective abilities of the manufacturer and the consumer to (a) recognize the
risks of the condition, (b) reduce such risks, and (c) absorb or insure agains t such




138. But see notes 156-58 infra and accompanying text.
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arguments, differing in methods and analyses, were published in
1970.139 The only point of absolute agreement among all of the econo-
mists seemed to be that the cost of products would rise. Arguments
were presented both in favor of and against the imposition of strict
liability. An argument sympathetic to concerns about the economic
impact of imposing strict liability was expressed by James Buchanan,
Professor of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute1 40 Professor
Buchanan set up hypothetical situations to illustrate the effects of strict
liability, one in which the risk of accidents caused by a product was
more likely and one in which such accidents were much less likely.1
41
In both cases, it was found that the cost of the product would rise, the
availability of the product would decrease, and the long range impact
would be to deprive those unwilling or unable to pay for the increased
cost of use of the product. In the words of Professor Buchanan: "The
effects on economic welfare are clear and unambiguous. The change
in liability arrangements reduces economic welfare generally, and this
reduction is concentrated on the poor."4
Justices must be sensitive to the fact that strict liability is a two-edged
sword. Not only does it facilitate a plaintiffs recovery, but it is also
one of the most regressive143 "tax systems" imposed in the United
States. Those in our society who can least afford it bear the brunt of
higher product prices.'"
139. Symposium, Products Liability: Economic Analysis andthe Law, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 1
(1970).
140. Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 64 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Buchanan].
141. Id. at 65-67.
142. Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
143. A "regressive tax" is not based on ability to pay. A "progressive tax" applies higher
rates as income increases. Regressive taxes were initially popular in our country; the found-
ing fathers came to the rather ironic and callous conclusion with respect to sales and excise
taxes that "[t]he poor can protect themselves [from the tax] by refusing to buy." L. EiSEN-
STEIN, THE IDEALOGiES oF TAXATION 17 (1961). See generally R. PAUL, TAXATION I THE
UNITED STATES 12-14, 737-38 (1954).
144. Of course, the adverse effect is felt by the economy as a whole.
Decreased profits, however, do not stop with the manufacturer. He distributes them to
the shareholders of his corporation, just as he distributes increased prices to the con-
sumers of his product. Moreover, decreased profits do not stop with the shareholders.
Rather, in more or less attenuated form, they pass on to other, broader classes. The
major distribution of decreased profits occurs when shareholders switch their invest-
ment to other, more profitable enterprises. When this happens, the liability-bearing
manufacturer's enterprise loses its ability to attract investment capital, resulting in de-
creased industrial activity. This decreased activity results in losses to several catego-
ries. First, the consumer will feel the loss because the manufacturer's ability to produce
a better, safer product will diminish. Second, reduced industrial activity will affect
labor. Severely diminished profits ma force the manufacturer out of business. Even
less drastic reductions, however, couldreduce the number of new jobs. Finally, re-
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C Economic Role of Electric Utilities and the Impact of Strict
Liability
Turning our attention specifically to electric utilities, it is arguable
that the imposition of strict liability is not worth the cost to society. In
any event, a substantial study of this matter is required, 45 a study
which should go beyond opposing appellate briefs in private litigation.
Consider initially the economic role of public utilities in our society.
Not only do they provide jobs, pay wages, and purchase land, among
other things, but in general can also be considered "social capital over-
head," providing services essential to economic growth and develop-
ment regardless of political structure or stage of development.
Effective transportation, good communications and flexible and relia-
ble power sources form the foundation without which comfort and eco-
nomic growth cannot exist.14"
Focusing specifically on the production of electricity, we are dealing
with a source of power without which our economy would come to a
grinding halt; witness the infamous Northeast blackout of several years
ago. Undeniably, every home, factory, business, school and hospital is
dependent upon the production of electricity at a reasonable rate. Any
change in the rate charged or the availability of electricity would affect
every member of our society directly, through increased rates for usage,
and indirectly through increased product costs, as manufacturers pass
the cost of production on to consumers. Professor Buchanan has ob-
served that the people least able to afford the increased cost would bear
the brunt of the courts' shortsightedness. 47 Those earning $25,000 a
year or more might well be able to bear a substantial increase in the
cost of electricity. The same cannot be said of a social security pen-
sioner who might find that electricity and products whose manufacture
depend heavily on electricity were rapidly becoming a luxury item in
his budget.
148
duced economic activity will affect the entire society, in a more or less attenuated form,
through lower tax revenues, lower wages, and lower profits for distribution.
Holford, he Limits of Strict Liabilityfor Product Design and Manufacture, 52 TEx. L. REV.
81, 87 (1973) (emphasis added), quotedin Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 28,
142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 620 (1977) (dissenting opinion).
145. The judiciary has recently suggested that perhaps other branches of government with
a greater capacity for research into tort problems and their effect on society should be in the
forefront of social change in the tort system. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court,
20 Cal. 3d 578, 617, 574 P.2d 763, 787, 143 Cal. Rptr. 692, 716 (1978) (Clark, J., dissenting).
146. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITIES: REGULATION, MANAOEMENT, AND
OWNERSHIP 9-10 (1973).
147. Buchanan, supra note 140, at 67.
148. See note 144 supra. The fact that an electric utility can purchase liability insurance
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Other traditional strict liability policy arguments such as the "in-
ducement to create safer products" likewise need long study in order to
see if they are applicable to electric utilities. The most likely safety
goal sought by the courts would be to force electric companies to insu-
late each and every line transmitting electricity, since the cause of most
injuries appears to be the result of some form of contact with uninsu-
lated power lines. Insulating all lines would itself substantially in-
crease rates and make new service connections less likely as electric
companies sought to limit their liabilities. Worse yet, some courts
might regard the underground placement of all power lines as the only
feasible design alternative. Should such a policy be created in the
form of judicially imposed strict liability on electrical utilities, the cost
would be astronomical. Realistically, such goals could not be accom-
plished in the foreseeable future. As a result, electric utilities would
have strict liability imposed with all its attendant cost but without any
viable safety goal.149
IV. OTHER POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Electric Utilities Are Distinct From Those Business Entities Upon
Which Strict Liability Has Been Imposed
The public function of electric utilities creates a form of business en-
tity which does not easily fit into strict liability concepts. Although our
traditional preference in business has been toward a laissez-faire or free
enterprise system, certain areas of dominant public interest have caused
the public to intervene through government to protect that interest.
Public utilities fall within one of those areas; they are governed by
stringent regulations not applicable to ordinary manufacturers and
is not a decisive "policy reason" for imposing strict liability. Even the "father" of strict
liability, Prosser, recognized this fact.
What insurance can do, of course, is to distribute losses proportionately among a group
who are to bear them. What it cannot and should not do is to determine whether the
group should bear them in the first instance-and whether, for example, consumers
shall be compelled to accept substantial price increases on everything they buy in order
to compensate others for their misfortunes. Even the distribution of the losses through
insurance may be a process that has its flaws.
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1121 (1960). It is naive to believe that the increase in insurance cost is not passed on to the
consumer.
149. Perhaps under Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978), electric utility companies could avoid such a result: "[A] product may. . . be
found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design proximately
caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish... that, on balance, the benefits of the
challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design." Id. at 432,573 P.2d
at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
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may be thought of as falling mid-way between total social control (gov-




In California, a company wishing to produce electricity must apply
to the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for a certificate and "[n]o
...electrical corporation,. . . shall begin the construction of a...
plant, or system, or of any extension thereof, without having first ob-
tained from the commission a certificate that the present or future pub-
lic convenience and necessity require or will require such
construction."' 51 Thus, a private corporation wishing to supply elec-
tricity may not simply open up a business, solicit customers through
advertising, and freely engage in the business of producing electricity.
Unless public convenience and necessity require such production, no
certificate will be granted, and a public utility acts at its own peril in
expanding its plant without prior Public Utilities Commission ap-
proval.
1 52
The California Public Utilities Code'l 3 regulates the grant of
franchises by local governments, again restricting the entrance of pri-
vate corporations into the business of supplying electricity. The public
function of utilities distinguishes them from other private businesses
which are free to establish their businesses and sell their products with-
out the necessity of certification by a public commission like the PUC.
Business licenses and corporate charters, while regulations in a techni-
150. See Comment, State Action and Public Utilities, 24 DE PAUL L. REv. 1023, 1031-32
(1975). See also Note, ConstitutionalwLaw-Public Utilities-StateAction, 16 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REv. 867 (1975); Comment, Public Utilities & State Action: The Supreme Court
Takes a Stand, 24 CATH. U. AM. L. REv. 622 (1975); Note, Constitutional Law-State Ac-
tion, Termination of Electrical Service by Privately Owned Utility Does Not Constitute State
Action for Purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 EMORY L.J. 511 (1975); Comment,
Procedures/or Termination of Utility Service: The Requirements of Due Process, 64 KY. L.J.
180 (1975); Comment, Public Utilities-State Action and Informal Due Process After Jack-
son, 53 N.C.L. Rnv. 817 (1975); Note, Utility Terminations: Pay Now and Litigate Later (In
the State Courts), 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 855 (1975); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Termination of
Utility Services/or Non-Payment of Bill Without A Hearing Does Not Violate Due Process
Clause ofFourteenth Amendment, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 760 (1975); Comment, The Entitlement
to Municipal Water Service: Constitutional Problems in the Termination of a Public Utility
Service, 9 URB. L. ANN. 285 (1975); all reprinted in III PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW ANTHOLOGY
(A. Scheinman, ed. 1976).
151. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1001 (West 1975).
152. Industrial Communications Syss., Inc. v. Pomona Radio Dispatch Corp., 75 Cal.
P.U.C. 433 (1973).
153. See generall, CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 6001-6017 (West 1965 & Supp. 1978).
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cal sense, do not even approach the stringency of the regulations re-
stricting the entry of corporations into the business of supplying
electricity. When considered in addition to the mandatory service re-
quirements, controlled entry is a factor which demonstrates that the
strict liability imposed on the private sector is not really feasible when
dealing with a public utility.
2. Mandatory Service
Once a corporation has undertaken to supply electricity it is charged
with a public duty to provide service. This duty cannot be ignored or
abandoned without proper procedures designed to ensure that the pub-
lic will be provided with service.154 In addition, a public utility cannot
refuse to comply with a request to restore electric service from a resi-
dent in the utility service area simply because to do so would be un-
profitable, and service will be ordered restored where a public utility
has not justified its claim of impossibility. 55
The public duty of public utilities is a well settled principle:
As its name indicates, the term "public utility" implies a public use and
service to the public; and indeed, the principle determinative characteris-
tic of a public utility is that of service to, or readiness to serve, an indefi-
nite public (or portion of the public as such) which has a legal right to
demand and receive its services or commodities.
156
No other manufacturer of a "product" is subjected to such a legal duty
or controlled by such regulation. As such, the obligations of public
utilities and other manufacturers can be significantly differentiated.
Thus, the utility cannot implement the types of business decisions made
by ordinary businesses to mitigate the effects of strict liability. For
example, suppose the power lines which serve the town of X, popula-
tion 309, must run fifty miles through an area prone to fires. Through
no fault of the utility company their equipment has been the cause of
numerous fires resulting in substantial damage. If liability were im-
posed irrespective of fault, the utility might well make the decision that
utility service to X was too risky and not worth the cost. In the alterna-
tive, the electric utility might wish to encourage greater use of its elec-
154. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 761 (West 1975) which states in part:
The commission shall prescribe rules for the performance of any service or the fur-
nishing of any commodity of the character furnished or supplied by any public utility,
and, on proper demand and tender of rates, such public utility shall furnish such com-
modity or render such service within the time and upon the conditions provided in such
rules.
155. Cummins v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 72 Cal. P.U.C. 451 (1971).
156. 64 AM. Jun. 2d, Public Utilities § 1 at 549 (1972) (emphasis added). See also id. §
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tricity so that it could expand its operations, and make service to X
worth the risk. The law with respect to public utilities precludes either
action, at least without costly and time-consuming public hearings and
red tape. Hence, the utility is not able to take the "protective" meas-
ures adopted by private manufacturers when strict liability is imposed.
3. Rate Regulation
Unlike the ordinary manufacturer who can raise its product price at
will (based upon business judgments as to what the market will bear),
public utilities are required to obtain approval of the Public Utilities
Commission for any increase in rates. 57 This approval is given only
after an elaborate and time-consuming procedure, which includes a
public hearing. 58  The complexity of the procedure alone distin-
guishes public utilities from other manufacturers. Given the attitude
of the public and the increased cost of living in our society, it is highly
unlikely that the public would endorse a rate increase. This third fac-
tor, the inability to raise "prices," like the first two factors discussed in
this section, evidences the inability of an electric utility to function ade-
quately in a strict liability world. Perhaps administrative procedures
could be developed in order to allow for loss distribution; however, the
legislature would have to implement the administrative process.
In addition, public utilities are limited in their profits to a "reason-
able return." However amorphous the term "reasonable return" may
be, no other manufacturer is subject to the review of a public commis-
sion as to the amount of its profit. Likewise, public utilities are subject
to review by the Public Utilities Commission as to the expenses that
will be considered reasonable operating expenses for inclusion in the
rates charged for electricity.
159
Clearly, public electrical utilities cannot freely pass on the inevitable
cost increases resulting from the imposition of strict liability. This re-
sult is directly contrary to one of the basic principles underlying strict
liability, spreading the cost throughout society by insurance and/or an
increased price of the product. Courts should be wary of applying lia-
157. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 451, 726 (West 1975 & Supp. 1978).
158. CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE §§ 455, 705 (West 1975). The procedure is set forth in great
detail in COMMISSION ON CALIFORNIA STATE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION & ECONOMY,
A STUDY OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION app. VII-A at 101-25
(1974), showing the application of Southern California Edison Company, No. 53488, for a
major rate change. The request was denied.
159. CAL. PuB. UTIL. CODE § 796 (West 1975), for example, disallows expenses for adver-
tising for purposes other than conservation.
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bility doctrines which, although applicable to the typical business con-
cern, may not be appropriate to a public utility.
B. Creation of a Dual Standard Through Strict Liabili y: Sovereign
Immuniy
Although the precise issue has not been litigated in California, avail-
able authority points to the conclusion that publicly owned utilities are
by statute' 60 liable for their torts only when their negligence is a proxi-
mate cause of the injury. No California statute authorizes a claim
based on strict liability against a public entity, and although no Cali-
fornia cases have expressly precluded or affirmed such a claim, the
United States Supreme Court decisions of Laird v. Nelms16" ' and
Dalehite v. United States,62 interpreting similar immunity provi-
sions,163 held that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not permit the im-
position of strict liability of any sort upon the United States.'"
The privately and publicly-owned utilities provide exactly the same
service/product and perform almost identical functions in our society.
There is ample material to distinguish a public or private utility from a
private manufacturer and to suggest that a utility performing a service
that would otherwise be provided by the state should not be held to a
160. A brief background of government tort liability and the enactment of the California
Tort Claims Act of 1963 is set forth in Datil v. City of Los Angeles, 263 Cal. App. 2d 655,
660, 69 Cal. Rptr. 788, 791 (1968), as follows:
At common law the distinction between purely governmental functions and proprie-
tary functions of public entities was recognized as a basis for determining immunity or
nonimmunity from tort liability. Under that test the function of maintaining and oper-
ating jails and prisons was recognized as a governmental function.
However, in recent times, the immunities attaching to governmental functions has
progressively eroded as a result of special legislation and court interpretations of ame-
liorative statutes, culminating in the case of Muskopf v. Coming Hospital Dist .....
which virtually abrogated the doctrine of governmental immunity in California. Fol-
lowing that decision and relying largely on the study and report by the California Law
Revision Commission, the Legislature enacted the California Tort Claims Act of 1963.
The result is that today there is no common law governmental tort liability in this State
and '[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute' there is no liability on the part of a
public entity for any act or omission of itself, a public employee or any other person.
(Citations omitted).
The legislative comment to CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1966) states in pertinent part:
This section abolishes all common law or judicially declared forms of liability for
public entities .... In the absence of a constitutional requirement, public entities may
be held liable only if a statute... is found declaring them to be liable ....
... In other codes there are a few provisions providing for the liability of govern-
mental entities, E.g., Vehicle Code Section 17001 et seq. and Penal Code Section 4900.
But there is no liability in the absence of a statute declaring such liability ....
161. 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
162. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1356 (1970).
164. 406 U.S. at 802-03; 346 U.S. at 45.
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more stringent form of liability than state agencies performing that
function. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to creating a wholly
irrational and unexplainable distinction between publicly-owned and
privately-owned electric utilities.
V. CONCLUSION
There has long been an assumption on the part of many that the
doctrine of strict liability is ever-expandable at no cost to the public.
Commentators hail the fall of negligence "citadels" at every turn with-
out ever stopping to think that the citadel might be very valuable to
society as a whole.
In "The Fall" Prosser acclaims the conquest of the citadel of privity.
But he reveals his foreboding that irrational sequellae may tarnish a wor-
thy victory:
'The rest is the story of sack and slaughter, of riot, rape and rapine,
that has added an evil luster to the names of Moglebury and Bada-
joz, along with ancient Troy." '165
While this metaphor may overstate the implications of strict liability
as applied to the torts of electric utilities, it certainly appears that both
law and public policy favor the negligence status quo. Even in those
few situations where injuries occur due to a defective electrical product
subsequent to the passage of the electricity through the meter, where
there is at least no insurmountable legal obstacle to the imposition of
strict liability, the policy considerations discussed here weigh against
attachment of the strict liability doctrine and should preclude its use
altogether.
Gregory G Hollows
165. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 NJ. Super. 228,242,227 A.2d 539, 547 (Hudson County Ct.
1967), afrd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div.
1968) (per curiam), affd, 53 NJ. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969) (per curiam).
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